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Abstract
In some companies, corrective maintenance is conducted in-house but preventive
maintenance might be outsourced. This raises a need to optimise some parameters
such as the number of contracts from a perspective of the equipment owner. This
paper considers a maintenance policy for such a situation, analyses the roles of
the parameters in a PM model, proposes approaches to defining bonus functions,
and finally discusses special cases of both the PM policy and the bonus function.
Numerical examples are also given to explore the impact of parameters on the
expected lifecycle cost rate.
Keywords: maintenance outsourcing, preventive maintenance (PM); corrective main-
tenance (CM); minimal repair; bonus function.
1 Introduction
The issues of the optimum strategies of maintenance outsourcing have been studied by a
number of authors[1–13]. Existing research has been focused on either outsourcing both
preventive maintenance (PM) and corrective maintenance (CM) or outsourcing CM only.
Little attention, however, has been paid to the problem of outsourcing PM, which is discussed
in this paper.
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1.1 Prior work
In the literature, the types of maintenance outsourcing that have been studied so far in-
clude: Type-1 outsourcing: outsourcing both CM and PM[1–9], and Type-2 outsourcing:
outsourcing CM[10–13] only.
Type-1 outsourcing: both CM and PM are outsourced. PM policies in the context
of outsourcing both PM and CM have been discussed by a number of authors (see [1–6], for
example). [7,8] use incentive contracts to induce the contractor to select the maintenance
policy that optimises the total profit of the manufacturer and the contractor. In addition
to the consideration of CM and PM, [9] considers inspection policies and optimises the
contract parameter under different scenarios.
Type-2 outsourcing: Only CM is outsourced. Assuming that a sequence of CM con-
tracts will be made to maintain a piece of equipment and that the service market can
provide different kinds of CM contracts to the equipment owner 2 , [10,11] propose meth-
ods for determining the optimal series of CM contracts for the equipment’s lifetime. [12,13]
present decision models for selecting CM contracts based on multi-criteria decision making
theory, taking into account different variables such as cost and downtime.
Existing work can be categorised with Table 1.
Here: Table 1
1.2 Problems
In practice, however, there is a possibility that only PM is outsourced but CM is conducted
in house. This has been reported from time to time, for example, in [14] where a case about
outsourcing PM on power cables is presented.
When outsourcing PM, one might consider the following two options:
Option 1: PM on a piece of equipment will be outsourced to one agent within the lifecyle
of the equipment;
2 In this paper, we call the provider of maintenance service as an agent, and the recipient of the
maintenance service as an equipment owner.
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Option 2: PM on a piece of equipment will be outsourced to a number of agents within
the lifecyle of the equipment and the quality of PM actions conducted within a contract
period can be different.
Remarks on Option 2. Most companies periodically review (common periodicity is 3-5
years) their maintenance procedures, and make contracts with agents within these periods.
The maintenance levels can be different from period to period [15]. If we assume that a
PM contract starts from a PM action and ends with a PM, there can exist a time interval
between two adjacent contracts. Hence, this option will have a time line containing a series
events such as (also see Figure 1): a new piece of equipment to start→ τ0 → T1 → τ1 →
T2 → τ2 → · · · → τN−1 → TN → τN → replacement , where τk (k = 0, 1, 2, ...) is the
time interval between the end of the k-th contract and the start of the (k + 1)-th contract,
and Tk represents the length of the kth contract. Within different Tk, different agents are
contracted to undertake PM. Any failures between PM actions are rectified by the equipment
owner himself, but a penalty might be incurred on the failures to the agents. The quality
of the last PM conducted by an agent in his contract period can be vitally important, as it
can affect the remaining life of the equipment being maintained and therefore the optimum
choice of maintenance schedules within its subsequent periods. That is, a piece of equipment
maintained with good quality of the last PM conducted in a contract period might need
fewer PM actions within its remaining lifetime and also fewer failures might occur, whereas
a piece of equipment maintained with poor PM quality within a contract period might need
more PM actions within its remaining lifetime and more failures might occur. Hence, good
quality of the last PM in each contract period can be regarded as a profit to the owner as
he will pay less on maintenance within the remaining lifetime of the equipment. In such a
case, the owner of the equipment might be willing to pay a bonus to agents for encouraging
good PM quality.
As one can see in the following sections, mathematically, Option 1 is a special case of Option
2. Hence, this paper will only discuss Option 2.
Here: Fig 1
Compared to the first three variables listed in Table 1, Option 2 differs from existing research
in the following respects:
Type of outsourcing: Only PM is outsourced;
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Type of penalty: Different penalty schemes can be used.
• The quality of the last PM will be assessed and a bonus might be paid for good quality.
• Penalty for repair not being carried out within specified time limits is not applicable
here, as the agent does not undertake any CM upon equipment failures.
Decision variables: The objective is to seek the optimum series of PM contracts with
respect to the length Ti of a contract, the time interval τi between two adjacent contracts,
Penalty-2 and bonus schemes.
Hence, if a series of agents are contracted with the equipment owner, it is possible to introduce
a new penalty scheme in following:
• failures between PMs can incur Penalty-2 to the agents due to the reliability performance
specified in the maintenance contract being violated; and
• a bonus can be offered to the agent if the quality of the last PM in a contract is good.
It should be noted that [7,8] have already used the concept of bonus functions to encourage
good maintenance quality in the context of maintenance outsourcing. In [7,8], however, both
PM and CM are outsourced, which makes it different from the cases discussed in this paper.
This paper discusses PM policies used in Option 2. The equipment owner outsources PM
within fixed periods, in which periodic or sequential PM’s might be conducted. He might
pay a bonus to agents for their good PM quality. The paper investigates the roles of the
parameters in a typical PM model, proposes approaches to defining the bonus functions,
derives algorithms to optimise the expected lifecycle cost rate, and discusses special cases of
both the PM policy and the bonus function.
The paper considers optimising policies from a perspective of the equipment owner and
assumes that costs on CM, PM, and replacement, and the levels of PM are known. This
assumption might be rigorous for some cases as some values such as the levels of PM might
only be determined by the agents, and unknown to the equipment owner. However, from
a perspective of the equipment owner, he needs to assess the optimum values, including
contract length, time intervals between adjacent contracts, penalty and bonus, respectively.
Hence, such assumptions are necessary.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents notation and assumptions.
Section 3 derives the lifecycle cost rate, investigates the roles of the parameters in a typical
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PM model, proposes approaches to defining the bonus on PM actions, derives an algorithm
to search the optimal solution, and compares two special PM policies. Section 4 presents data
examples to look into the validity of the proposed models. Section 5 concludes the findings.
2 Notation and Assumptions
2.1 Notation
Here: Table 2
2.2 Assumptions
A typical lifecycle of the equipment under study is shown in Fig 1. Suppose the following
assumptions hold.
A.1 The planning horizon is infinite.
A.2 The failure intensity function, h0,0(t), of the equipment before any maintenance inter-
vention is conducted is continuous and strictly increasing.
A.3 The lifecycle of the equipment is defined as the time interval between two adjacent re-
placements. That is, the time in a lifecycle progresses as: a new piece of equipment to start →
τ0 → T1 → τ1 → T2 → τ2 → · · · → τN−1 → TN → τN → replacement . Tk is called a the
k-th contract period. For simplicity, we assume that Tk = T in this paper.
A.4 Within the k-th contract period, mk PM actions are conducted at time points (k−1)T+∑k−1
i=0 τi + tk,1, (k− 1)T +
∑k−1
i=0 τi + tk,1 + tk,2, ..., (k− 1)T +
∑k−1
i=0 τi +
∑mk
i=1 tk,i, respectively,
where k = 1, ..., N .
A.5 The quality of the last PM in the k-th contract period might be different from the first
(mk − 1)th PM’s in the same period 3 .
A.6 Repair between PM actions is assumed to be minimal repair. A replacement is carried
out at the end of a lifecycle. The equipment used in the replacement is a new, identical
3 This assumption holds as only the maintenance quality of the last PM in each contract period
will affect the reliability of the equipment in its subsequent time periods, and moreover, the case
that PM’s have the same quality within a contract period is a special case of this assumption.
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item.
A.7 The time on any PM, minimal repair, and replacement are negligible.
3 Model formulation and analysis
3.1 Option 1
In Option 1, PM is outsourced to one agent.
3.2 Option 2
In Option 2, a series of PM contracts are outsourced to different agents. In this case, the
equipment owner might be interested in optimising the following parameters:
• time lengths including T and τi, where i = 0, 1, 2, ...;
• value of Penalty-2 and bonus value.
Following the above assumptions, we can derive the expected lifecycle cost rate as follows
C(N, T, τ0, ..., τN , t1,1, ..., tN,mN ) =
G(N, T, τ0, ..., τN , t1,1, ..., tN,mN )
N∑
k=0
τk +NT
, (1)
subject to
mk−1∑
i=1
tk,i = T, (2)
where
G(N, T, τ0, ..., τN , t1,1, ..., tN,mN )
= co,1
∫ τ0
0
h0,0(t)dt+
N∑
k=1
[
cc,k
mk−1∑
i=1
∫ tk,i
0
hk,i(t)dt+ co,k
∫ τk
0
hk,mk(t)dt+ ck
]
+
N∑
k=1
Qk(hk,mk(τk)) + cr, (3)
k = 1, 2, ..., N , and mk > 2.
In Eq. (1),
∑N
k=0 τk +NT is the expected time length of a lifecycle. In Eq. (3),
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• co,1 ∫ τ00 h0,0(t)dt is the expected cost on failures within time interval (0, τ0),
• cc,k
mk−1∑
i=1
∫ tk,i
0
hk,i(t)dt is the expected cost on failures within time interval ((k − 1)T +∑k−1
i=0 τi +
∑i−1
j=1 tk,j, (k − 1)T +
∑k−1
i=0 τi +
∑i
j=1 tk,j), where k ≥ 1;
• co,k ∫ τk0 hk,mk(t)dt is the expected cost on failures within time interval (kT +∑k−1i=0 τi, kT +∑k−1
i=0 τi + τk);
• Qk(hk,mk(τk)) is the bonus on the last PM in the k-th contract period, and
• ck is the cost paid for the k-th contract,
• cr is the replacement cost in a lifecycle.
Qk(hk,mk(τk)) is the bonus paid to the k-th agent who is responsible for the last PM in the
k-th contract period, which considers PM quality that can affect PM frequency needed in its
subsequent contract period(s). This makes Eq. (1) different from the problem of traditional
PM policy optimisation (see [16–19], for example), in which the quality of the last PM has
not been distinguished. Further discussion on Qk(hk,mk(τk)) will be carried out in Sections
3.3.
In Eq. (1), the equipment owner needs to optimise N, tk,i and τk. He might also need to choose
the bonus function Qk(hk,mk(τk)). But before doing so, the bonus function Qk(hk,mk(τk))
needs to be discussed.
3.3 The bonus function
In the section, we discuss the choice of the bonus function Qk(hk,mk(τk)).
3.3.1 PM models
In Eq. (1), defining the function Qk(hk,mk(τk)) is important. hk,mk(τk) usually defines a PM
model. In the reliability literature, PM models are introduced to assess PM quality (see
[20,21], or Eq. (4) in the following, for example). The parameters in a PM model play
important roles in measuring PM quality. In this section, we analyse the roles of those
parameters, then in the following section we define the bonus function Qk(hk,mk(τk)).
PM models are developed based on adjusting either the failure intensity function of a piece
of equipment or its age. After a maintenance action is carried out on a, the failure intensity
7
of the equipment is assumed to change from hk,i−1(t) to hk,i(t). If we assume that the quality
of the first (mk − 1)th PM actions in the k-th contract period are identical and the quality
of the last PM is different, a typical case of hk,i(t) associated with hk,i−1(t) given by [20] is
hk,i(t) = ak,ihk,i−1(φk,it+ ψk,i) + bk,i, (4)
where ak,i(>)0, φk,i(> 0), bk,i and ψk,i are parameters.
If we consider Assumption (A.5), we have
• if 1 ≤ i ≤ mk − 1, then let ak,i = a′k,0, bk,i = b′k,0, φk,i = φ′k,0, and ψk,i = ψ′k,0;
• if i = mk, then let ak,mk = a′k,1, bk,mk = b′k,1, φk,mk = φ′k,1, and ψk,mk = ψ′k,1.
Then, Eq. (4) can also be re-written as
hk,i(t) = Akih0,0(Φkit+ Ψki) +Bki, (5)
where A00 = 1,Φ00 = 1,Ψ00 = 0, B00 = 0, m0 = 0, for k ≥ 1,
Ak,i =

a0kAk−1,mk−1 if i = 1
a0kAk,i−1 if 2 ≤ i ≤ mk − 1,
a1kAk,i−1 if i = mk
Φk,i =

φ0kΦk−1,mk−1 if i = 1
φ0kΦk,i−1 if 2 ≤ mk − 1,
φ1kΦk,i−1 if i = mk
Ψk,i =

φ0kΨk−1,mk−1 + ψ0k if i = 1
φ0kΨk,i−1 + ψ0k if 2 ≤ mk − 1,
φ1kΨk,i−1 + ψ1k if i = mk
and Bk,i =

a0kBk−1,mk−1 + b0k if i = 1
a0kBk,i−1 + b0k if 2 ≤ mk − 1.
a1kBk,i−1 + b1k if i = mk
The PM model shown in Eq. (4) can be seen as an extension of a wide spectrum of PM
models such as those introduced in [21–23], etc.
Estimating the parameters in the bonus function as shown in Eq. (4) is vital. In practise,
for example, we might estimate the parameters in Eq. (4) based on data collected from
the equipment owner who might have a large number of pieces equipment of the same
type maintained and have enough field data, or based on expert elicitation to estimate the
parameters.
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A simpler situation might be to count the number of failures within the time period τk to
assess the quality of the last PM conducted by an agent.
3.3.2 Some bonus functions
From Eq. (4), we have
• Assume hk,i−1(φk,it+ ψk,i) is smaller than 1. Then we have ∂hk,i(t)∂ak,i = hk,i−1(φk,it+ ψk,i) ≤
∂hk,i(t)
∂bk,i
= 1, which implies that an improvement in bk,i can affect hk,i−1(φk,it + ψk,i) more
effectively than ak,i can; and
• As hk,i−1(φk,it+ψk,i) is an increasing function, h′k,i−1(φk,it+ψk,i) > 0. If t > 1, then ∂hk,i(t)∂φk,i =
h
′
k,i−1(φk,it + ψk,i)t >
∂hk,i(t)
∂ψk,i
= h
′
k,i−1(φk,it + ψk,i), which implies that an improvement in
φk,i can affect hk,i−1(φk,it+ ψk,i) more effectively than ψk,i can.
Remark. The above two bulleted points show that φk,i and bk,i in Eq. (4) can play more
important roles than parameters ak,i and ψk,i.
From the above discussion, we can define Qk(hk,mk(τk)), if we assume that it only depends
on the parameters, ak,i, bk,i, φk,i, and ψk,i, in Eq. (4). It might be reasonable to assume that
Qk(hk,mk(τk)) is in inverse proportion to the values ak,i and φk,i, and in direct proportion to
the values ψk,i and bk,i. For example, if PM only changes the parameter ak,i in Eq. (4), then
one might estimate the bonus using the following equation.
Qk(hk,mk(τk)) =

exp(−θ1ak,i) if ak,i < 1
0 otherwise,
(6)
where θ1 is a positive parameter.
ak,i, bk,i, φk,i, and ψk,i play different roles, according to the above remark, which should be
noted when we define/estimate the parameter θ1.
We might also consider the following scenarios on the relationship between Qk(hk,mk(τk))
and the mkth PM in the k-th contract period.
• NoF (number of failures) based approach. Qk(.) is a function of ∫ x0 hk−1,mk−1(t|τk−1 +T )dt−∫ x
0 hk,mk(t)dt:
∫ x
0 hk,mk−1(t|τk−1 + T )dt is the number of failures of the equipment within
the next x time units, given that the equipment has survived τk−1 +T time units after the
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last PM in the (k − 1)-th contract period; ∫ x0 hk,mk(t)dt is the number of failures of the
equipment within a given time, (0, x) say, after the last PM in the k-th contract period.
Qk(hk,mk(τk))
=

eθ2(
∫ x
0
hk−1,mk−1 (t|τk−1+T )dt−
∫ x
0
hk,mk (t)dt) if
∫ x
0 hk−1,mk−1(t|τk−1 + T )dt >
∫ x
0 hk,mk(t)dt
0 otherwise.
(7)
where θ2 is a positive parameter.
Using this bonus function, we aim to measure the reduction of the number of failures
after the last PM is conducted in the k-th contract period.
• Remaining life based approach.Qk(.) might also be defined as a function of ∫∞0 udFk,mk(u)−∫∞
0 udFk−1,mk−1(u|τk−1 +T ):
∫∞
0 udFk,mk(u) is the expected life of the equipment just after
the last PM in the k-th contract period, and
∫∞
0 udFk−1,mk−1(u|τk−1 + T ) is the remaining
life of the equipment, given that it has survived for τk−1 + T time units since the last PM
in the (k − 1)-th contract period. For example, one might define that
Qk(hk,mk(τk))
=

eθ3(
∫∞
0
udFk,mk (u)−
∫∞
0
udFk−1,mk−1 (u|τk−1+T )) if
∫∞
0 udFk,mk(u) >
∫∞
0 udFk−1,mk−1(u|τk−1 + T )
0 otherwise,
(8)
where θ3 is a positive parameter.
Using this approach will encourage the (k − 1)-th maintenance company to conduct
better maintenance to prolong the time length before the k-th company is contracted.
3.4 Maintenance policies
We assume that hk,i(•) is defined by Eq. (4), and Qk(hk,mk(τk) is defined by Eq. (6). To find
the optimal solution that minimises C(N, τ0, τ1, ..., τN , t1,1, ..., tN,mN ), we can set the partial
derivatives of C(N, τ0, τ1, ..., τN , t1,1, ..., tN,mN ) with respect to τ0, τ1, ..., τN , t1,1, ..., tN,mN to 0,
respectively, which gives
co,1h0,0(τ0)
( N∑
k=0
τk +NT
)
= G(N, T, τ0, τ1, ..., τN , t1,1, ..., tN,mN ), (9)
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(
co,kAk,mkh0,0(Φk,mkτk + Ψk,mk) +
∂Qk(hk,mk(τk))
∂τk
)( N∑
k=0
τk +NT
)
(10)
= G(N, T, τ0, τ1, ..., τN , t1,1, ..., tN,mN ),
and
cc,kAk,ih0,0(Φk,itk,i + Ψk,i)− cc,kAk,mkh0,0(Φk,mk(T −
mk−1∑
i=1
tk,i) (11)
+Ψk,mk) +
∂Qk(hk,mk(τk))
∂tk,i
= 0.
For generality, we have not replaced
∂Qk(hk,mk (τk))
∂tk,i
with the one in Eq. (6).
From equations (9) and (11), we have
co,kAk,mkh0,0(Φk,mkτk + Ψk,mk) +
∂Qk(hk,mk(τk))
∂τk
= co,1h0,0(τ0). (12)
The computing procedure to obtain an optimal schedule can be specified as follows: let
N be fixed, then obtain the solutions based on the following steps, after that compare
C(N, T, τ0, τ1, ..., τN , t1,1, ..., tN,mN ) on the solutions, and then choose those solutions with
the minimal
We can specify the computing procedure to obtain an optimal schedule as follows: we can
fix N , then obtain the solutions based on the following steps, then compare
C(N, T, τ0, τ1, ..., τN , t1,1, ..., tN,mN ) on the solutions, and then choose those solutions with the
minimalG3(N, T, τ0, τ1, ..., τN , t1,1, ..., tN,mN ). In the following algorithm, we assumeQk(hk,mk(τk))
is simply related to τk (k = 1, 2, ..., N).
• Let N = 1, 2, 3, ..., n, where n is a given upper limit;
• Solve Eq. (12), and express τk (k = 0, ..., N) by a function of τ0;
• Solve Eq. (12) with respect to tk,i;
• Substitute τk and tk,i into Eq. (9) to obtain τ0;
• Substitute τ0 into Eq. (12) to obtain τk; and
• determine N which minimises Eq. (1).
The above algorithm has simplified the optimisation problem of a complex mixed integer
programming to the optimisation problem of an integer programming.
The above algorithm only considers to optimise the frequency of the PM. Similarly, we can
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also optimise the bonus function and penalty costs in each contract periods: he can find the
optimum parameters through minimising the expected cost in Eq. (1).
3.4.1 Special cases of the PM policy
PM can be conducted either periodically or sequentially. The periodic PM policy is more
frequently used due to its simplicity in scheduling, and the sequential PM policy is less
frequently used. An interesting PM policy in Option 2 might be a hybrid of the periodic PM
policy and the sequential PM policy. In this section, the following two special maintenance
policies are investigated (see Figure 1).
• Periodic–sequential (PS) PM policy. Within a given time period T , periodic PM is per-
formed, but the values τk are unequal for k = 1, 2, ..., ie., tk,1 = tk,2 = ... = tk,mk and
τ1 6= τ2 6= ..., 6= τN . The quality of PM’s within a time period T are the same but are dif-
ferent among different time periods T ’s. Denote CPS = C(N, T, τ0, τ1, ..., τN , t1,1, ..., tN,mN )
as the expected lifecycle cost rate of this case.
• Sequential–periodic (SP) PM policy. Within a given time period T , sequential PM is
performed. The values τk are equal for k = 1, 2, ..., ie, tk,1 6= tk,2 6= ... 6= tk,mk and
τ1 = τ2 = ...,= τN . The quality of PM’s within a time period T are the same but are dif-
ferent among different time periods T ’s. Denote CSP = C(N, T, τ0, τ1, ..., τN , t1,1, ..., tN,mN )
as the expected lifecycle cost rate of this case.
An interesting question is which PM policy, periodic–sequential PM policy or sequential-
periodic PM policy, is better regarding the expected cost rate. The following two Lemmas
list sufficient conditions for comparing the two policies.
Lemma 1 Denote τ =
1
N + 1
N∑
k=0
τk, and assume that τ0 ≥ τ1 ≥ · · · ≥ τk0 ≥ τ ≥ τk0+1 ≥
. . . τN , then
•
∫ τ
0
h0,0(t)dt+
N∑
k=1
∫ τ
0
hk,mk(t)dt ≥
∫ τ0
0
h0,0(t)dt+
N∑
k=1
∫ τk
0
hk,mk(t)dt if
max{h0,0(τ0), h1,m1(τ1)..., hk0,mk0 (τk0)} ≤ min{hk0+1,mk0+1(τk0+1), ..., hN,mN (τN)}.
•
∫ τ
0
h0,0(t)dt+
N∑
k=1
∫ τ
0
hk,mk(t)dt ≤
∫ τ0
0
h0,0(t)dt+
N∑
k=1
∫ τk
0
hk,mk(t)dt if
min{h0,0(τ0), h1,m1(τ1)..., hk0,mk0 (τk0)} ≥ max{hk0+1,mk0+1(τk0+1), ..., hN,mN (τN)}.
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The proofs for the Lemmas in this paper can be found in Appendix.
Lemma 2 Denote tk,0 =
1
mk − 1
mk−1∑
i=1
tk,i, Qk(hk,mk(τk)) is measured with Eq. (6), and as-
sume that tk,1 ≥ tk,2 ≥ · · · ≥ tk,ik ≥ tk,0 ≥ tk,ik+1 ≥ . . . tk,mk−1 for k = 1, ..., N . Then,
• CSP > CSP if max{h0,0(τ0), h1,m1(τ1)..., hk0,mk0 (τk0)} ≤ min{hk0+1,mk0+1(τk0+1), ..., hN,mN (τN)},
and
min{hk,1(tk,1), ..., hk,ik(tk,ik)} ≥ max{hk,ik+1(tk,ik+1), ..., hk,mk(tk,mk−1)}.
• CSP < CSP if max{h0,0(τ0), h1,m1(τ1)..., hk0,mk0 (τk0)} ≥ min{hk0+1,mk0+1(τk0+1), ..., hN,mN (τN)},
and
min{hk,1(tk,1), ..., hk,ik(tk,ik)} ≤ max{hk,ik+1(tk,ik+1), ..., hk,mk(tk,mk−1)}.
Lemma 2 gives sufficient conditions for comparing the two PM policies with respect to their
expected lifecycle cost rate.
4 Illustrative examples
Consider a case where the life distribution of a piece of equipment under consideration is
a 2-parameter Weibull distribution at operating state. The failure intensity is assumed to
be h0(t) =
1
8
( t
24
)2. That is, its corresponding lifetime distributions is given F (t) = 1 −
exp{−( t
24
)3}. We set N = 3, T = 36, cr = 5000, co,k = cc,k = 100e0.5k, Qk(hk,mk(τk)) =
0.1e
0.8
ak−1 . In Eq. (4), without loss of generality, we set ak,i =
k+5.2
k+4
, φk,i = 1, ψk,i = 0, and
bk,i = 0.
4.1 Comparison between the PS and the SP policies
Using the above parameters, we obtain the optimal PS and SP policies as shown in Tables 3
and 4, from which one can find that the two policies reach their optimal values when N = 3.
However, the expected lifecycle cost rate of the SP policy is greater than that of the PS
policy.
For the optimal policies N = 3, if we further prolong the length of τ in the SP policy to let
τ =
1
N + 1
N∑
k=0
τk, we can obtain Table 5, from which one can find that the expected lifecycle
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cost rate of the SP policy (67.12) is more than 1.4 times as big as that of the PS policy
(47.73).
Here: Figure 2.
Here: Table 3
Here: Table 4
Here: Table 5
4.2 Impact of PM quality
Changing parameter ∆ in ak,i =
k+∆
k+4
, we can investigate the impact of the parameters ak,i
on the expected lifecycle cost rate for the two policies, ie., the PS policy and the SP policy
( as shown in Table 6). For example, the changes of CPS against ∆ are shown in Figure 2,
which is a concave curve and the expected long-run cost rate reaches the optimal value when
∆ = 5.2.
Here: Table 6
4.3 Impact of CM cost
Now, we re-set co,k = cc,k = 100e
cmk. That is, we set N = 3, T = 36, cr = 5000,
Qk(hk,mk(τk)) = 0.1e
0.8
ak−1 , and ak =
k+5.2
k+4
. We change cm from 0.1 to 1, the expected lifecycle
cost rate shows a linear relationship with cm, as shown in Table 7.
Here: Table 7
5 Conclusions
This paper considers providing equipment owners with approaches to benchmarking various
parameters for the case where PM is outsourced. It investigated the roles of the parameters
in a PM (PM) model in respect to PM quality, derived an approach to measuring the profit
14
of good PM actions, and derived an approach to searching the optimal solutions.
Future research includes:
• The planning horizon is assumed infinite in this paper. Another consideration that can be
taken is the scenario of finite planning horizon.
• The contract periods (i.e., T ) in a lifecycle are assumed to be identical in the paper. A
reasonable extension can be to assume that they are varying.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
∫ τ
0
h0,0(t)dt+
N∑
k=1
∫ τ
0
hk,mk(t)dt−
∫ τ0
0
h0,0(t)dt−
N∑
k=1
∫ τk
0
hk,mk(t)dt
=
∫ τ
τ0
h0,0(t)dt−
k0∑
k=1
∫ τk
τ
hk,mk(t)dt+
N∑
k=k0+1
∫ τ
τk
hk,mk(t)dt
≥ −max{h0,0(τ0), h1,m1(τ1)..., hk0,mk0 (τk0)}
k0∑
k=0
(τk − τ)
+ min{hk0+1,mk0+1(τk0+1), ..., hN,mN (τN)}
N∑
k=k0+1
(τ − τk)
≥ −min{hk0+1,mk0+1(τk0+1), ..., hN,mN (τN)}
k0∑
k=0
(τk − τ)
+ min{hk0+1,mk0+1(τk0+1), ..., hN,mN (τN)}
N∑
k=k0+1
(τ − τk)
= min{hk0+1,mk0+1(τk0+1), ..., hN,mN (τN)}
N∑
k=0
(τ − τk) ≥ 0
This proves the 1st bulleted item in Lemma 1. 
Similarly, we can prove the 2nd bulleted item in Lemma 1.
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Fig. 1. A PM model (Tk=the length of the k-th contract, PPM=periodic PM, SPM=Sequential
PM, Pki=the i-th PM action in the k-th contract).
Fig. 2. Impact of PM quality on the expected long-run cost rate.
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Table 1
A summary of some existing papers.
Type of outsourcing Type of penalty a Decision variables References
PM & CM Penalty-1 & Penalty-2 PM policy [1–3]
PM & CM Penalty-1 or Penalty-2 PM policy or else [4–6,9]
CM Penalty-1 CM contracts [10–13]
a Penalty-1 : Penalty for repair not being carried out within specified time limits; Penalty-2: Penalty for equipment failures.
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Table 2
Notation.
N number of contracts before a replacement is carried out;
k number of the contracts that the equipment has been passed, k = 0, 1, 2, ..., N ;
i number of the PM actions that an agent has carried out;
mi number of PM actions performed by the i-th contractor;
τk time interval between the end of the (k)-th contract period;
and the start of the (k + 1)-th contract period;
tk,i time interval between the i-th and the (i+ 1)-th PM in the k-th contract;
T length of a contract period;
Fk,i(t) failure distribution function after the ith PM in the k-th contract period;
hk,i(t) failure intensity function after the ith PM in the k-th contract period;
mk number of PM’s within the k-th contract period;
cc,k cost per CM within the k-th period after the penalty cost due to the failure has been paid.
cc,k can be negative or positive;
co,k cost per CM during the period of the τk after the penalty cost due to the failure has been
paid. co,k can be negative or positive;
ck value of the k-th contract;
cr cost per replacement;
Qk(.) bonus function.
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Table 3
The expected lifecycle cost rate of the PS policy.
N τ1 m1 τ2 m2 τ3 m3 τ4 m4 τ5 m5 τ6 m6 τ7 CPS
1 34.13 3 12.26 75.98
2 28.71 3 11.99 10 2.78 53.75
3 27.06 2 12.59 4 5.04 15 1.00 47.73
4 30.04 1 15.57 3 6.83 5 2.65 18 1.01 58.85
5 43.59 3 18.21 4 8.76 5 3.98 6 1.51 20 1.15 123.89
6 63.79 2 29.68 2 14.27 3 6.49 3 3.04 6 1.55 20 1.27 265.34
Table 4
The expected lifecycle cost of the SP policy.
N τ1 m1 τ2 m2 τ3 m3 τ4 m4 τ5 m5 τ6 m6 τ7 CPS
1 21.31 2 21.31 83.17
2 8.64 2 8.64 5 8.64 65.15
3 3.85 2 3.85 4 3.85 6 3.85 62.34
4 2.32 2 2.32 2 2.32 4 2.32 7 2.32 83.62
5 1.13 2 1.13 3 1.13 4 1.13 6 1.13 18 1.13 235.17
6 1.10 2 1.10 3 1.10 3 1.10 5 1.10 5 1.10 24 1.10 358.79
Table 5
Comparison between the PS and the SP policies.
Policies τ , τ1 t1, t1i τ , τ2 t2, t2i τ , τ3 t3, t3i τ , τ3 CPS , CSP
PS 32 18 18 20 9 9 9 9 11 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 47.73
SP 11 19 17 11 10 9 9 8 11 7 7 6 6 5 5 11 62.34
SP 17.25 19 17 17.25 10 9 9 8 17.25 8 6 6 6 5 5 17.25 67.12
Table 6
Impact of PM quality on the expected lifecycle cost rate.
∆ 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5
CPS 60.13 44.56 39.53 37.72 37.02 37.02 36.77 36.92 37.16 37.48
CSP 325.59 82.58 69.45 66.74 63.64 63.89 64.15 66.30 66.91 68.88
∆ 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10
CPS 39.81 43.22 46.00 49.06 52.78 57.41 62.84 69.42 76.62
CSP 87.32 110.15 143.54 187.78 246.64 314.86 416.21 481.74 578.23
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Table 7
Impact of CM cost on the expected lifecycle cost rate.
cc,k 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
CPS 31.34 32.67 34.03 35.42 36.77 38.17 39.68 41.32 43.15 45.25
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